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Animal Rights without Controversy♦
Jeff Leslie* and Cass R. Sunstein**

Abstract
Many consumers would be willing to pay something to reduce the suffering of
animals used as food. The problem is that existing markets do not disclose the
relevant treatment of animals, even though that treatment would trouble many
consumers. Steps should be taken to promote disclosure, so as to fortify market
processes and to promote democratic discussion of the treatment of animals. In the
context of animal welfare, a serious problem is that people’s practices ensure
outcomes that defy their existing moral commitments. A disclosure regime could
improve animal welfare without making it necessary to resolve the most deeply
contested questions in this domain.
I.

Of Theories and Practices

To all appearances, disputes over animal rights produce an extraordinary amount
of polarization and acrimony. Some people believe that those who defend animal rights
are zealots, showing an inexplicable willingness to sacrifice important human interests
for the sake of rats, pigs, and salmon. Judge Richard Posner, for example, refers to “the
siren song of animal rights,”1 while Richard Epstein complains that recognition of an
“animal right to bodily integrity . . . will not happen, and it should not happen.”2 Others
believe that those who ridicule animal rights are morally obtuse, replicating some of the
cruelty and abuse of sexism, slavery, and even the Holocaust. Gary Francione, a
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See Richard A. Posner, “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspectives,” in Animal
Rights: Current Controversies and New Directions 74 (Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum eds.
2004).
2
Richard A. Epstein, “Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights,” in id. at 157.

prominent defender of animal rights, contends that animals should have “the right not to
be treated as our property.”3
We believe that the intensity of certain conflicts over animal rights obscures an
important fact: Almost everyone agrees that animal suffering matters, and that it is
legitimate to take steps to reduce it. In a recent poll, for example, two-thirds of
Americans agreed with the following statement: “An animal’s right to live free of
suffering should be just as important as a person’s right to be free of suffering.”4 This
statement of equivalence probably does not adequately reflect people’s reflective
judgments; but it is surely true that a social consensus supports the view that in deciding
what to do, both private and public institutions should take animal suffering into account.
Of course people disagree about how people should treat animals. But the tension
between competing beliefs is less remarkable than the tension between widespread
practices and widespread moral commitments. Every day of every year, people engage in
practices that ensure extraordinary suffering for animals. We believe that if those
practices were highly visible, they would change, because many people already believe
that they are morally unacceptable. This point makes existing treatment of animals
extremely unusual. A great deal of progress could be made, not by challenging existing
moral judgments, but by ensuring that they are actually respected.
Our goal here is to suggest a simple way to bring our practices and our moral
judgments into closer alignment. In short, consumers should be informed of the treatment
of animals used for food, so that they can make knowledgeable choices about what food
to buy. Disclosure of animal treatment would have the virtue of making markets work
3

Gary L. Francione, “Animals—Property or Persons?” in id. at 108.
See David Foster, “Animal-Rights Tenets Are Gaining Support in U.S., Poll Shows,” The Seattle
Times, December 3, 1995, p.A4. Ninety-one percent of Americans also believe that the U.S. Department
of Agriculture should be involved in safeguarding human treatment of animals. See Amanda Tolles with
Steve Dyott, “Consumers Seek to Curb Farm Animal Suffering,” 96 Business & Society Review 19
(Winter 1996). A study on New Jerseyans’ opinions on animal treatment found that the vast majority of
consumers were opposed to several treatment practices common among producers: 83% of those polled felt
that confining pregnant pigs and veal calves to stalls too small for them to turn around or stretch out should
not be allowed; 82% were against cutting off the tails of cows or pigs without use of pain killers; 81% were
against withholding food from chickens for up to 14 days to increase egg production; 78% were against
transporting livestock that are emaciated or unable to stand up; and 74% were against feeding calves liquid
diets with no fiber or iron. Eagleton Institute of Politics Center for Public Interest Polling, New Jerseyans’
Opinions on Humane Standards for Treatment of Livestock 4 (2003) (performed on behalf of Farm
Sanctuary), available at http://www.njfarms.org/NJ_opinons.pdf (last visited February 9, 2006). The study
also asked how important it was to respondents that farm animals and livestock in New Jersey be treated
humanely; 65% replied that it was very important and 24% somewhat important. Id. at 16.
4
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better; it would also have the advantage of ensuring more and better in the way of
democratic discussion about the treatment of animals. Moreover, it would be possible to
accomplish both of these goals without taking a stand on the issues that most sharply
divide people. We might, in short, obtain an agreement on a relevant practice – one of
disclosure – amidst uncertainty or disagreement about the most fundamental issues, and
protect animals from serious suffering in the process, To understand these claims, it is
necessary to back up a bit.
II. Laws and Gaps
In 1789, the year of ratification of America’s Bill of Rights, Jeremy Bentham
argued:
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights
which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.
The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason
why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
tormentor. . . . A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational,
as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even
month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The
question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”5
In his time, Bentham’s argument to this effect was exceptionally controversial.
But the argument is no longer much contested. Consider, for example, the fact that every
state of the union has long maintained anticruelty laws, specifically designed to reduce
the suffering of animals.6 Of course the idea of “rights” can be understood in many
different ways, and it is possible to understand the term in a way that would deny that
animals can have “rights.”7 But if the idea of rights is taken in the pragmatic terms of
positive law, to mean legal protection against harm, then many animals already do have
rights, because they enjoy such protection. And if we take “rights” to mean a moral claim
to such protection, there is general agreement that animals do have rights of certain kinds.
5

See Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation 310-11 n 1 (Prometheus 1988).
See generally Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Anti-Animal Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 Animal L.
69 (1999) (reviewing anti-cruelty statutes and penalties in all 50 states and the District of Columbia); see
also Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 Animal L. 131 (2005)
(detailing the modern trend towards strengthening anticruelty laws still further).
7
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 505 (1971) (suggesting that animals deserve consideration but not
justice). For a critique, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species
Membership (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values) ch. 6 (Harvard Univ. Press 2005).
6
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Of course some people, including Descartes, have argued that animals are like
robots and lack emotions -- and that people should be allowed to treat them however they
choose.8 But almost everyone agrees that people should not be able to torture animals or
to engage in acts of cruelty against them. It is in response to this agreement that state law
contains a wide range of protections against cruelty and neglect.9
In the United States, state anticruelty laws go well beyond prohibiting beating,
injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative duties on people having animals in their
care. In New York, for example, people may not transport an animal in a cruel or
inhuman manner, or in such a way as to subject it to torture or suffering, conditions that
can come about through neglect.10 People who transport an animal on railroads or cars
are required to allow the animal out for rest, feeding, and water every five hours.11
Nonowners who have impounded or confined an animal are obliged to provide good air,
water, shelter, and food.

12

Those who abandon an animal in public places, including a

pet, face criminal penalties.13 A separate provision forbids people from torturing, beating,
maiming, or killing any animal, and also requires people to provide adequate food and
drink.14
Indeed New York makes it a crime not to provide necessary sustenance, food,
water, and shelter.15 New York also forbids overworking an animal, or using the animal
for work when she or he is not physically fit.16 Compare in this regard the unusually
protective California statute, which imposes criminal liability on negligent as well as
intentional overworking, overdriving, or torturing of animals.17 “Torture” is defined not
in its ordinary language sense, but to include any act or omission “whereby unnecessary
or unjustified physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted.”18

8

See Rene Descartes, Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy 34-36 (David
Weissman ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1637).
9
See supra note 6.
10
See NY Agr & Mkts Law § 359(1) (McKinney 1991 & Supp 2002).
11
See id. § 359(2).
12
See id. § 356.
13
See id. § 355.
14
See id. § 353.
15
See id. §§ 353, 356.
16
See id. § 353.
17
See Cal Penal Code §§ 597(b), 599b (West 1999).
18
Id. § 599(b).
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If taken seriously, provisions of this kind would do a great deal to protect animals
from suffering, injury, and premature death. But protection of animal welfare under state
law is sharply limited, and for two major reasons. First, enforcement can occur only
through public prosecution. If horses and cows are being beaten at a local farm, or if
greyhounds are forced to live in small cages, protection will come only if the prosecutor
decides to provide it. Of course prosecutors have limited budgets, and animal protection
is rarely a high-priority item. The result is that violations of state law occur with some
frequency, and realistically speaking, there is no way to prevent those violations. The
anticruelty prohibitions sharply contrast, in this respect, with most prohibitions protecting
human beings, which can be enforced both publicly and privately. For example, the
prohibitions on assault and theft can be enforced through criminal prosecutions, brought
by public officials, and also by injured citizens, proceeding directly against those who
have violated the law.
Second, and even more significantly, the anticruelty provisions of state law
contain extraordinarily large exceptions. They do not apply to the use of animals for
medical or scientific purposes. Much more important, they do not apply to the production
and use of animals as food. About ten billion animals are killed for food annually in the
United States;19twenty-three million chickens and some 268,000 pigs are slaughtered
every day.20 The cruel and abusive practices generally involved in contemporary farming
are largely unregulated at the state level. On factory farms, animals “live out their short
lives in a shadow world. The vast majority never experience sunshine, grass, trees, fresh
air, unfettered movement, sex, or many other things that make up most of what we think
of as the ordinary pattern of life on earth. They are castrated without anesthesia, on
occasion deliberately starved, live in conditions of extreme and unrelieved crowding, and
suffer physical deformities as a result of genetic manipulation.”21
Consider, for example, the lives of pregnant pigs, who spend much of their time
in small metal stalls, lined up in such a way that they are unable to turn around and can
19

See David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, “Foxes in the Hen House: Animals, Agribusiness and the
Law: A Modern American Fable,” in Animal Rights: Current Controversies and New Directions 206 (Cass
R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum eds. 2004). By contrast, hunters and trappers, animal shelters,
biomedical research, product testing, dissection, and fur farms combined are responsible for 218 million
animal deaths per year. Id.
20
See id.
21
See id. at 217-18.
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take only a single step forward or back. After giving birth, they are impregnated again,
and again, until they are slaughtered at three years of age.22 For their part, young calves
spend their lives in small wooden stalls, disabling them from turning around. To ensure
that their flesh remains white, calves are frequently kept anemic.23 Almost all eggproducing chickens live in battery cages; more specifically, eight or more hens are
typically placed in cages that are twenty inches by nineteen inches. These birds are
unable to spread their wings. Because the cages are so crowded, the weakest birds
become ill and die. Producers cut off the hens’ beaks because of the wounds that would
occur from fighting, inevitable in such close quarters. Because beaks are the major
method by which hens explore their world, the loss of beaks causes lifelong suffering.24
This is simply an illustration of the kind of suffering that is ensured by existing
practices.25 Short of radical change, of the kind that is sought by some animal rights
activists, what might be done by way of correction?
III. Gap-Filling
It would be possible to respond to the gaps in existing anticruelty laws in various
ways. The least controversial response might be to narrow the “enforcement gap,” by
allowing private suits to be brought in cases of cruelty and neglect. Reforms might be
adopted with the limited purpose of stopping conduct that is already against the law, so
that the law actually means, in practice, what it says on paper. On this view,
representatives of animals should be able to bring private suits to ensure that anticruelty
and related laws are actually enforced. If, for example, a farm is treating horses cruelly
and in violation of legal requirements, a suit could be brought, on behalf of those animals,
to bring about compliance with the law. At first glance, it is not clear why anyone should
oppose an effort to promote greater enforcement of existing law, by supplementing the
prosecutor’s power with private lawsuits.
An increase in enforcement would not, however, do anything to reduce the
mistreatment of animals used for food, which is the most important problem. In many
22

See id. for a description of customary pig farming practices.
See id. at 219.
24
See id. at 218 for a description of customary chicken farming practices.
25
For a more detailed overview, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation 95-157 (rev. ed., Ecco 2002)
(1975).
23
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nations, regulatory steps have been taken to reduce that mistreatment. The United States
lags far behind Europe on this count. Sweden forbids gestation crates, requires cows and
pigs to have access to straw and litter in their stalls, and bans drugs or hormones except
for the treatment of disease.26 Battery cages have been prohibited in Switzerland, which
also requires calves to receive sufficient iron in their diets.27 The United Kingdom forbids
both anemic diets for veal calves and also veal crates.28 The European Union has banned
veal crates, gestation crates, and all battery egg production; it is replacing the latter
system with much larger spaces for hens and free-range farming.29
The United States could easily move in this direction - and it could do so without
getting into especially contested moral territory. But we suggest an alternative, or perhaps
complementary, approach. Among the most dramatic developments of the last decades of
American law has been the shift from command-and-control regulation to disclosure of
information as a regulatory tool.30 In countless areas, government has required agencies
and companies not to alter their practices but to disclose them. Sometimes the goal is to
make democratic processes work better, by providing people with information to inform
their political judgments. The Toxic Release Inventory, for example, requires companies
to disclose their toxic releases, in a way that can activate political processes.31 So too, the
National Environmental Policy Act makes agencies discuss, in public, the environmental
effects of their activities, so that citizens can bring their concerns to bear.32 And
sometimes the goal is to make markets work better, by giving people information that
bears on their choices. Most familiarly, cigarette manufacturers must offer information
about the health risks associated with smoking;33 much more ambitiously, food is now
26

See Wolfson and Sullivan, supra note 19, at 222.
See id.
28
See id.
29
See id. For an overview, see Peter Stevenson, European Union Law on the Welfare of Farm Animals
(2004), available at http://www.ciwf.org.uk/publications/reports/EU_Law_2004.pdf (last visited February
1, 2006).
30
For an overview, see Mary Graham, Democracy by Disclosure: The Rise of Technopopulism (2002);
Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment 191-228 (2002).
31
See 42 U.S.C. §11023; for a discussion of the success of the Toxic Release Inventory, see Archon
Fung and Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Explaining and
Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 Envtl. Mgmt. 115 (2000).
32
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4270 (2000).
33
See the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1994) (requiring inclusion
of one of four warnings on cigarette advertising and packaging: (1) Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease and May Complicate Pregnancy; (2) Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to
27
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sold with information about the ingredients and nutritional content.34 In all of these
contexts, significant behavioral changes have occurred.35
It is worth underlining the two different justifications for disclosure strategies.
First, such strategies can make markets work better, by letting consumers know what they
are purchasing. This point holds most obviously when consumers lack information that
bears on their own welfare – as, for example, when consumers do not know about a
safety risk associated with a product or activity. But if consumers also have moral
concerns that bear on the use of a product, the market-improving potential of disclosure
continues to hold. When people make a purchasing decision, they care whether it will do
what it is supposed to do, and also whether it will impose risks. But sometimes they also
care about its production, and in particular about whether their decisions are producing
moral or immoral behavior. Many consumers are willing to pay to produce less in the
way of moral damage, and more in the way of moral benefit.
Second, disclosure requirements can serve democratic functions, by enabling
citizens to receive information that bears on democratic judgments. Perhaps most
consumers would be willing to pay little to improve animal welfare; perhaps the social
role of consumer, where money may be paramount, will dampen their ordinary moral
concerns; perhaps the obvious collective action problem may lead many consumers to
pay little attention on the theory that their individual decisions will have little effect. But
even if this is so, information about animal suffering may have significant effects on the
political domain. It may energize public debate, activating ordinary citizens and
representatives alike. To the extent that this effect is a product of increased information,
exposing practices previously hidden from public view, there is every reason to welcome
it.

Your Health; (3) Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth
Weight; and (4) Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide).
34
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(i) (2001) (requiring ingredient list to
avoid misbranding) and § 343(q) (requiring nutritional information to avoid misbranding).
35
See Council on Envtl. Quality, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of Its Effectiveness
After Twenty-Five Years 29 (1997) (noting that prior to NEPA, agency decisions were made without
reference to environmental information); Madhu Khanna et al., Toxic Release Information: A Policy Tool
for Environmental Protection, 36 J. Envtl. Econ & Mgmt. 243, 243-45 (1998) (discussing the regulatory
effect of the Toxic Release Inventory on industry behavior); Fung and O’Rourke, supra note 31, at 115
(detailing the success of the TRI and recommending appliation of TRI structure to other contexts);
Sunstein, supra note 30, at 191-228 (discussing the effects of various informational regimes).
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Now engage in a thought experiment, one with a science fictional element:
Imagine that people could be informed, immediately and costlessly, of the treatment of
animals used in the food that they are purchasing. Imagine too that the disclosure is not
tendentious or biased - that every effort is made to present the relevant facts and to do so
accurately. If so informed, consumers could purchase food as they see fit. To the extent
that they were willing to pay for improvements in animal welfare, they could do exactly
that. Extending the thought experiment, imagine a market in which consumers not only
knew about the treatment of animals used for food, but also could pay in specified
increments for better treatment (including no suffering at all). By hypothesis, the “animal
welfare market” would be perfected, in the sense that animal welfare would be bought
and sold, and in a way that is highly likely to lead to real improvements.
Of course there is much to say about this thought experiment. Many animal
welfare advocates would see a step in this direction as distressingly cautious and perhaps
even problematic. What if consumers are not, in fact, willing to sacrifice much for animal
welfare? Should animal welfare really be bought and sold, or does this create a kind of
market in suffering, in a way that would be self-evidently unacceptable in the domain of
human beings? Does not the welfare of animals count, independently of how much
human beings are willing to pay to improve it? Why should the suffering of animals
depend on how much people are willing to pay to reduce it? These are excellent
questions, and we do not attempt to answer them here.36 But at least it can be said that for
those who are interested in animal welfare, a movement in the direction of the thought
experiment is likely to do far more good than harm, or some good and no harm -- and that
if one goal of law is to ensure that social practices are in line with social values, the
experiment is highly suggestive.
There are also evident pragmatic problems. This thought experiment is just that.
No technology can ensure that consumers could be immediately and costlessly informed
of the treatment of animals in relevant foods. But if the thought experiment of interest,
36

Clearly, those who believe that we should prohibit the use of animals for food will not be satisfied with
a disclosure regime. They might even conclude that it is counterproductive to their cause, if the disclosure
regime led consumers to conclude that buying humanely produced meat satisfied all their moral obligations
to animals. On the other hand, animal use abolitionists might embrace a disclosure regime for instrumental
reasons, if they thought it would cause society to confront the harms suffered by animals and move society
closer to an abolitionist perspective.
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we can immediately see that it is possible to take steps in its direction. Some animal
welfare organizations and even industry groups have attempted to do exactly that by
developing guidelines and certification programs for food producers who claim to use
humane animal husbandry techniques.
examination.

These are laudable steps and warrant close

For reasons discussed below, however,

the existing guidelines and

certification programs do not go nearly far enough in giving consumers the information
that they need to make informed choices. Much more can be done to give consumers
relevant information at the point of purchase, allowing them to compare producers and
take account of the treatment of animals in their purchasing decisions. Let us now turn to
existing practice.
IV. Guidelines and Certification: A Progress Report
The first animal welfare organization to promulgate humane animal husbandry
guidelines was the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, headquartered
in the United Kingdom.37 Various animal welfare organizations in the United States and
Canada have followed suit with their own guidelines, including Humane Farm Animal
Care,38 the American Humane Association,39 the Animal Welfare Institute,40 and the
37

The RSPCA guidelines program began in 1994.
See Freedom Food – About Us, at
http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg=AboutUs (last visited
February 8, 2006). For the RSPCA’s substantive guidelines, see RSPCA Welfare Standards for Chickens
(January 2002 edition); RSPCA Welfare Standards for Beef Cattle (June 2000 edition); RSPCA Welfare
Standards for Dairy Cattle (August 2004 edition); RSPCA Welfare Standards for Ducks (February 2006
edition); RSPCA Welfare Standards for Laying Hens and Pullets (February 2006 edition); RSPCA Welfare
Standards for Pigs (October 2003 edition); RSPCA Welfare Standards for Farmed Atlantic Salmon (June
2002 edition); RSPCA Welfare Standards for Sheep including Dairy Sheep (September 2001 edition);
RSPCA Welfare Standards for Turkeys (August 2004 edition). All welfare standards are available at
http://www.rspca.org.uk/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RSPCA/RSPCARedirect&pg=welfarestandards (last
visited February 8, 2006)
38
See Humane Farm Animal Care, Animal Care Standards: Beef Cattle (2004 edition); Animal Care
Standards: Broiler Chickens (2004 edition); Animal Care Standards: Egg Laying Hens (2004 edition);
Animal Care Standards: Dairy Cows (2004 edition); Animal Care Standards: Dairy, Fiber, and Meat Goats
(2005 edition); Animal Care Standards: Pigs (2004 edition); Animal Care Standards: Sheep (including
dairy sheep) (2005 edition); Animal Care Standards: Turkeys (2004 edition); Animal Care Standards:
Young Dairy Beef (2005 edition).
All guidelines are available with registration at
http://www.certifiedhumane.com/documentation.asp (last visited January 31, 2006).
39
See the American Humane Association, Free Farmed Certification Program website at
http://www.americanhumane.org/freefarmed (last visited January 31, 2006). Animal welfare standards are
not available online, but can be requested by calling (303) 792-9900 or by writing American Humane, 63
Inverness Drive East, Englewood, CO 80112.
40
See Animal Welfare Institute, Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs (updated 2004); Humane
Husbandry Criteria for Beef Cattle and Calves (updated 2005); Humane Husbandry Criteria for Rabbits
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British Columbia Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.41

Some of these groups,

like the RSPCA, go further and license producers who conform to their guidelines. The
RSPCA authorizes producers to carry the “Freedom Food” logo, Humane Farm Animal
Care has its own “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” logo,42 and the American
Humane Association sponsors the “Free Farmed” logo.43

Trade groups that have

adopted humane animal husbandry guidelines include the American Meat Institute,44 the
National Chicken Council,45 the National Pork Board,46 United Egg Producers,47 and the
Food Marketing Institute, a trade group for supermarkets, food retailers and wholesalers,
which has issued guidelines jointly with the National Council of Chain Restaurants.48
At first glance, guidelines of this kind might be taken as a form of voluntary selfregulation, in a way that could do considerable good. Imagine that market pressures, in
which consumers lack information, lead to a kind of competition that produces
increasingly harsh treatment of animals. Suppose that those who produce and sell food
have every incentive to produce tasty food cheaply, and that the market increases neglect,
cruelty, and suffering, simply because producers will lose customers if they take animalprotective steps. Imagine too that if they seek to protect animal welfare, companies need
(updated 2003); Humane Husbandry Criteria for Ducks (updated 2004); Humane Husbandry Criteria for
Sheep (updated 2006). All welfare standards are available at http://www.awionline.org/farm/standards.htm
(last visited January 31, 2006).
41
See British Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, SPCA Certified: Standards for
the Raising & Handling of Laying Hens; Standards for the Raising & Handling of Broiler Chickens;
Standards for the Raising & Handling of Beef Cattle; Standards for the Raising & Handling of Pigs;
Standards for the Raising & Handling of Dairy Cattle. All welfare standards can be requested from the
program website at http://www.spca.bc.ca/farm/standards.asp (last visited January 31, 2006).
42
See supra note 38; for more details on the “Certified Raised and Handled” logo, see
http://www.certifiedhumane.com (last visited on January 31, 2006).
43
See supra note 39.
44
See American Meat Institute, Recommended Animal Handling Guidelines and Audit Guide (2005
edition), available at
http://www.meatami.com/Template.cfm?Section=Animal_Welfare1&CONTENTID=3256&TEMPLATE=
/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited January 31, 2006).
45
See National Chicken Council, Animal Welfare Guidelines and Audit Checklist (2005 edition),
available at http://www.nationalchickencouncil.com (last visited January 31, 2006).
46
See National Pork Board, Swine Welfare Assurance Program Manual (2003 edition), available at
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/swapManual.aspx (last visited January 31, 2006).
47
See United Egg Producers, Animal Husbandry Guidelines for U.S. Egg Laying Flocks (2005 edition),
available at http://www.uepcertified.com/abouttheprogram.html (last visited January 31, 2006).
48
See the Animal Welfare Audit Program (AWAP) website at http://www.awaudit.org (last visited
January 31, 2006). Audit program documents are not available online, but can be requested from SES, Inc.,
which administers AWAP, by calling (913) 307-0056 or writing Eric Hess or Frank Bryant, SES, Inc., 6750
Antioch Road, Suite 305, Merriam, Kansas, 66204. The AWAP audit documents are also on file with the
authors.
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to cartelize, in some way, in order to break (or brake) the competition.

A set of

guidelines might seem ideally suited to that task, at least if they are enforceable through
informal sanctions (including moral suasion). Rather than activating consumer concerns,
such guidelines might even reflect moral judgments on the part of producers themselves,
operating as the motivation for a check on the profit motive.
In actual operation, existing guidelines have four different uses. First, they serve
as a self-assessment tool for producers, helping them to see whether their activities
comply with certain baseline moral requirements. Second, they operate as a means for
retailers to assess and hold accountable their suppliers, transporters, processors, and other
links in the chain of production. Third, and not trivially, they work as a public relations
strategy for enhancing the image of a producer group – a goal that should not be
underrated in light of the risks of bad publicity and regulation. Finally, they provide a
basis for certification programs for producers who want to make certain claims about
their humane methods.

This last purpose is the only one that is directly connected to

consumer disclosure, which is our emphasis here. Note, however, that even guidelines not
explicitly aimed at the consumer market are part of an ongoing campaign to win over
consumers (and, most likely, to forestall government initiatives in this area). Consider in
this regard the National Pork Board’s explanation for launching the Swine Welfare
Assurance Program:
Animal rights and humane groups have escalated their efforts to a new level – one
that impacts what consumers think of pork. Communications with fast food
chains and retailers indicate that responsibility for animal welfare assurances may
be transferred back to the producer. . . . [T] he Swine Welfare Assurance
Program™, or SWAP™, . . . [is] the pork industry’s proactive initiative to this
increasing consumer awareness of animal welfare.49
Guidelines of this sort could in theory do a great deal of good, and both producers
and trade groups have trumpeted their existence. In light of their goals, the trumpeting is
understandable. Unfortunately, the guidelines have proved woefully inadequate, at least
as a means of disclosing useful information to consumers. A central reason is that the
guidelines address different aspects of animal treatment with different levels of detail,

49

See the Swine Welfare Assurance Program, Why a Welfare Assurance Program? at
http://www.porkboard.org/SWAPHome (last visited February 1, 2006).
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making comparisons exceedingly difficult.

Consider the guidelines for pigs.

The

American Meat Institute’s guidelines address humane handling and slaughtering practices
at meatpacking facilities for pigs.50

Humane Farm Animal Care adopts the AMI

guidelines for slaughter, and also covers a host of farming practices, including guidelines
for food and water, design of buildings, lying areas, space allowances, and transportation,
to name a few.51 The Animal Welfare Institute guidelines and the National Pork Board
guidelines each address farming practices for pigs but not slaughtering issues.52
The competing guidelines for pig farming are complex and cover many, but not
all, of the same activities. The National Pork Board guidelines address, in close to 40
pages, herd health and nutrition, caretaker training, animal observation, body condition,
euthanasia, handling and movement, facilities including ventilation, heating and cooling,
physical space, pen maintenance, feeder space, water availability, and hospital pens,
emergency support, and continuing assessment and education.53

The Animal Welfare

Institute addresses, in nine pages, environmental enrichment and shelter, access to the
outdoors, space and grouping requirements, light, bedding management, environmental
minimums and enrichment, hygiene and safety, loading, unloading and transport, actions
in case of injury or illness, antibiotics and other treatments, and food and water.54 Many
of the guidelines are quantitative -- laying out, for instance, precise dimensions of
farrowing pens for pigs,55 and specifying permissible water flow rates required in
drinking systems.56
How well could the average consumer draw comparisons based on these
guidelines? The length and complexity of the guidelines make them quite inaccessible to
the lay reader. Unless a consumer is an expert on animal husbandry, or is willing to
become one, it will be impossible to detect and evaluate the substantive differences

50

See supra note 44.
See supra note 38, Animal Care Standards: Pigs (2004 edition).
52
See supra notes 40 and 46.
53
See supra note 46.
54
See supra note 40, Humane Husbandry Criteria for Pigs (updated 2004).
55
See, e.g., Humane Farm Animal Care, Animal Care Standards: Pigs 9 E22 (2004 edition) (requiring
that farrowing pens be a minimum of 5 x 7 ft., but recommending pens of 10 ft. x 10 ft., with a piglet
protection zone of at least 8 sq.ft.), available with registration at
http://www.certifiedhumane.com/documentation.asp (last visited January 31, 2006).
56
See, e.g., id. at 4 FW 16 (requiring a minimum flow rate of .75-quarts/minute for drinkers used by
lactating sows).
51
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between the competing guidelines.

And much care is taken not to distinguish one

producer from another, at least not in any way that is visible to consumers.57 By
themselves, then, existing guidelines are hopelessly inadequate as a tool for informing
those who buy food.
The certification programs for producers hold far more promise. In the United
States, Humane Farm Animal Care has developed the “Certified Humane” certification
and labeling program,58 and the American Humane Association maintains the “Free
Farmed” certification and labeling program.59 Both programs are voluntary, user-fee
based services, whereby producers submit information and undergo inspections leading
up to certification. Inspectors have training in veterinary medicine, animal science, and
related fields, and may be employees of the certifying organization or independent
contractors.60 On the industry side, only the United Egg Producers (UEP) has developed
a certification program.61 To be certified to carry UEP’s “Animal Care Certified” label
on its eggs, a producer must follow UEP’s guidelines at all of its production facilities, file
a monthly compliance report with UEP, and pass an annual audit conducted by
independent auditors designated and approved by UEP.62
The Certified Humane, Free Farmed, and Animal Care Certified labeling
programs should be distinguished from other auditing and monitoring regimes that have
no certification component. Such programs have been prevalent on the industry side.

57

For example, the American Meat Insitute voted in 2002 to make animal welfare a non-competitive
issue in the industry, on the theory that this would promote open sharing of ideas, information, and
expertise to enhance animal handling and welfare. See Alberta Cattlefeeders’ Association, “AMI Board
Votes to Make Animal Welfare a Non-Competitive Issue: Vote Signifies Industry’s Ongoing Commitment
to Optimal Animal Handling in Plants,” October 24, 2002, available at
www.cattlefeeder.ab.ca/manure/trade021024.shtml (last visited February 2, 2006).
58
See supra note 38.
59
See supra note 39.
60
See Certified Humane Certification Program Frequently Asked Questions at
http://www.certifiedhumane.org/faq.html (describing the Certified Humane certification process) (last
visited February 1, 2006); The Free Farmed Certification Process at
http://www.americanhumane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=pa_farm_animals_ff_cert_process (describing
the Free Farmed certification process) (last visited February 1, 2006).
61

See supra note 47.
See Requirements of a United Egg Producers Certified Company at
http://www.uepcertified.com/abouttheprogram.html (last visited February 1, 2006). Of 204 applicants for
certification, only eleven have failed the first audit. Failed applicants are given 60 days to improve
conditions; only one producer has failed a second time. Telephone interview with Gene Gregory, Senior
Vice President, United Egg Producers, October 7, 2004.
62
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The American Meat Institute promotes regular self-audits by slaughter plants to measure
their compliance with AMI’s animal welfare guidelines.63 The National Pork Board
administers the voluntary Swine Welfare Assurance Program (SWAP) for American pork
producers to assess the care and welfare of their pigs according to criteria set forth by the
National Pork Board’s Animal Welfare Committee.64

After the assessment, and

regardless of how well or poorly the assessment goes, SWAP registers the producer with
the National Pork Board as a SWAP Assessed site and the producer receives a SWAP
Assessed Certificate.65
Perhaps the most robust program on the industry side is the Animal Welfare
Assurance Program established by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI) and the National
Council of Chain Restaurants (NCCR). FMI and NCCR collectively represent food
retailers, food wholesalers and chain restaurants. They have developed animal welfare
guidelines for a variety of different species, in collaboration with the National Chicken
Council, the National Pork Board, and similar trade groups.66 The Animal Welfare
Assurance Program (AWAP) measures compliance with those standards through a feebased inspection and monitoring program similar to the Certified Humane and Free
Farmed programs described above. In contrast to those programs, however, the AWAP
approach confers no certification or license to carry a particular logo or label, and AWAP
participants are free to retain their own auditors, choosing them from among the
inspectors who are certified by the AWAP administrator and who have bid for the job.67
Requests for audits, and audit results, are confidential.68 In the period between 2004 and
2005, six non-poultry slaughter audits were completed under the AWAP program. In the
current year, 2005 through 2006, two dairy, five poultry slaughter, one non-poultry
slaughter and 16 broiler AWAP audits have been completed.69 All audit results are
confidential and can only be released by the audited facility.70
63

See supra note 44 at 4.
See supra note 49.
65
See Swine Welfare Assurance Program, How do I participate in SWAP as a Producer?
http://www.pork.org/Producers/SWAP/SWAP.aspx (last visited February 1, 2006).
66
See supra note 48.
67
For a description of AWAP’s audit program, see their website at http://www.awaudit.org/ (last visited
February 1, 2006).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
http://www.awaudit.org/DesktopModules/ViewAnnouncements.aspx?AnnId=13
64
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Increasing participation rates and making inspection results available to the public
would help, but by themselves, these steps would not overcome the most serious
problems facing the competing labeling, auditing and monitoring regimes, which are their
complexity and their sheer quantity. The average consumer does not have, and will not
expend the time and energy to obtain, an adequate understanding of the competing animal
husbandry guidelines or the variations in inspection methodologies and frequency.
The promulgation of best practice guidelines and animal welfare certification
regimes for food producers are important and valuable. In terms of delivering useful
information to consumers, however, these regimes have serious flaws. What might be
done instead?
V. A Modest Proposal
We propose that food producers should make disclosures about their treatment of
animals in a way that is genuinely useful to consumers. The foundation for this proposal
is the belief that existing moral commitments draw current practices into serious
question, and consumers should be permitted to express their commitments through their
purchasing decisions. Hence disclosure would serve a market-improving function in a
domain in which many (certainly not all) consumers should be expected to be willing to
pay for more in the way of animal welfare. In addition, we believe that moral beliefs with
respect to treatment of animals should be a more significant part of democratic discussion
and debate, in a way that would undoubtedly cause changes in both practices and beliefs.
Animal welfare is infrequently a salient issue in political life in part because the
underlying conduct is not seen. Indeed, many consumers would undoubtedly be stunned
to see the magnitude of the suffering produced by current practices.71 But deliberative
discussion cannot occur unless citizens have the information with which to engage in it.
71

In fact, the Better Business Bureau recently recommended that United Egg Producers discontinue its
“Animal Care Certified” label on the grounds that it misleads consumers. See Associated Press, “Business
group shells egg-industry adds: Better Business Bureau disputes humane claim,” May 11, 2004, reported at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4951194/ (last visited February 2, 2006). The BBB found that the UEP
standards actually improved animal treatment, but that industry standards for the treatment of egg-laying
hens—which allow for artificially inducing molting through food withdrawal and for trimming or burning
off birds’ beaks—would not be considered “humane” by most consumers. See id. In October 2005, with
encouragement from the Federal Trade Commission, the United Egg Producers agreed to stop using the
Animal Care Certified label, and instead to label eggs as “United Egg Producers Certified.” Alexei
Barrionuevo, “Egg Producers Relent on Industry Seal,” The New York Times, October 4, 2005, at C18.
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In fact there are likely to be dynamic interactions between the market-perfecting
and democracy-improving functions of disclosure. With respect to animal welfare, most
people’s values are not firm and fixed. Their moral commitments, and even their
behavior, is endogenous to what they know, and to what they learn from others. Many of
those who think that they do not care about animal welfare might well change their
minds, and their behavior, if they are exposed to certain kinds of mistreatment. Those
who are relatively indifferent to the topic might be less indifferent once they hear what
other citizens have to say. In the domain of race and sex equality, an emphasis on
concrete practices helped to activate general public concern. The same is likely to be true
here. For advocates of animal welfare, the hope would be for a kind of virtuous spiral, in
which disclosure helped to heighten discussion and debate, in a way that did not merely
activate, but instead transformed and deepened, existing moral commitments.
Whether or not this is likely, we suggest that disclosure policies, initiated
voluntarily or required, could strengthen both market processes and political ones. In this
way, our proposal draws on the market-improving and democracy-facilitating functions
of many recent regulatory initiatives. Here, as elsewhere, it would be best if producers
voluntarily disclosed the relevant information, spurred perhaps by growing consumer
interest and by the hope, on the part of some producers, that disclosure of good practices
would increase market share. But it is also worth considering disclosure mandates, at the
state and even national levels.
What kind of disclosure should occur? We do not attempt to create a blueprint
here. Our aim is to suggest a general approach, not to specify a means of implementing it.
But the first points, growing out of past experience with disclosure strategies,72 are the
simplest. Any disclosure must be relevant to consumers’ moral beliefs, compatible with
their existing routines, delivered at the right time, and written in concise, comprehensible
language. On the producer side, disclosure will be most effective if it prompts consumers
to act in ways that matter to producers, and if producers find it feasible to respond to
consumers’ reactions.
As a threshold matter, whatever disclosure is made might well be contained on the
food label itself.
72

Consumers are accustomed to consulting labels for nutritional

See supra notes 30-35.
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information and organic food claims; adding an animal welfare labeling component
would be consistent with how consumers already shop. This is the central insight of the
Certified Humane and similar logos.

Information on the label stands a chance of

reaching the average consumer, but off-label information is likely to be seen only by the
most motivated of consumers.73
Would significant numbers of consumers care enough about animal welfare to
look at a label? Perhaps the best evidence of consumer interest in animal welfare is the
speed with which producers and retailers are moving to position themselves as supporters
of humane animal treatment through the certification and auditing programs discussed
earlier.74 Nor is industry missing the mark in reacting in this way. Many people believe
that human beings can and should take more steps to reduce animal suffering, and this
concern is reflected in public opinion surveys,75 studies on consumer’s willingness to pay
higher prices for better treatment of animals,76 and the growing consumer interest in
products that make claims regarding humane treatment of animals.77 The challenge, then,
is to design a food label that provides the maximum amount of useful, accessible animal
welfare information. There are two major possibilities here.

73

Labeling food sold in grocery stores is a familiar practice. Applying a labeling system to other food
outlets -- deli counters, restaurants, hot dog stands, and the like -- is imaginable, but considerably more
challenging. Should a restaurant have to trace and disclose the practices of each supplier of every kind of
meat and other animal product on the menu? How available must the disclosure be? Must it be made part
of the menu, or, as is the case with nutritional claims, is it enough to require restaurants to have the
information available upon request? See 21 CFR § 101.9(j)(2)(i). Although the practical difficulties are
perhaps greater with non-grocery store food outlets, there are many possibilities for displaying a label or
labels that could be effective, including menus, food packaging, and prominently displayed signs.
74
See supra notes 44-49.
75
See supra note 4.
76
See, e.g., David Dickinson & DeeVon Bailey, “Willingness-to-Pay for Information: Experiential
Evidence on Product Traceability from the USA, Canada, the UK, and Japan,” 12-13 (Utah State
University Economic Research Institute Study Paper # 2003-12) (2003) (showing that consumers are
willing to pay 4-9% more for pork and 9-28% more for beef that carries additional guarantees of humane
animal treatment and meat safety), available at http://www.econ.usu.edu/Research/03/ERI2003-12.pdf (last
visited February 2, 2006); R.M. Bennett, J. Anderson, and R.J.P. Blaney, “Moral Intensity and Willingness
to Pay Concerning Farm Animal Welfare Issues and the Implications for Agricultural Policy,” J. Agric.
And Envt’l Ethics 15:187, 193 (2002) (showing that survey participants in the U.K. were willing to pay
approximately $1.68/per week more for eggs from chickens raised outside of cages).
77
See “Consumer Views on Animal Production Pushing Toward More Ethical Husbandry,” Feedstuffs
Magazine (Jan. 1. 2001) (discussing the industry impact of consumers’ preferences for humane treatment of
food animals), available online at http://www.upc-online.org/010101feedstuffs.html (last visited February
10, 2006); Swine Welfare Assurance Program, Why a Welfare Assurance Program? supra note 49
(explaining that increased consumer awareness of animal welfare necessitates proactive industry action).
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The first is to rely on a trusted intermediary, one who sifts through all the relevant
information and comes up with a rating. Intermediaries of this kind -- offering thumbs up
or thumbs down, one to four stars, or letter grades from A to F – are pervasive; they
figure in everything from movie ratings to automobile roll-over tests to investment
analysts’ buy-sell recommendations. Certified Humane and similar logos all rely on this
approach, in that the consumer turns over the analysis of the food producers to the
certifying agency, which has expertise in humane animal treatment.

Use of

intermediaries makes sense when consumers ultimately can judge whether the
intermediary is doing an adequate job.
For food, however, there is a serious difficulty: A consumer has no easy basis for
deciding that the animal welfare ratings of a particular certifying agency are wrong, or
inferior to that of a competing certifying agency. The meat does not look or taste any
different. An intermediary could rate the intermediaries – witness Consumer Union’s
ratings of other organization’s eco-labels78 – but this just pushes the problem up a level.
A second problem with relying on intermediaries is that such reliance misses a
key opportunity to enlighten consumers about some of the actual, concrete practices that
underlie the raising of animals for food -- practices which, if consumers were confronted
with them, may cause a rethinking of existing preferences for certain foods. Labels like
“Certified Humane” and “Free Farmed” by themselves tell consumers nothing about the
underlying methods involved – about what, exactly, is being done to animals in the
production of food. Suppose that it is true that consumers have different intuitions from
industry insiders about what counts as humane treatment of animals; recall the consumer
reaction in polls where it was revealed that Animal Care Certified standards permitted
beak trimming, crowded cages, and similar conditions.79 If so, then even best practices in
the industry may be found morally questionable.
It is possible to imagine an alternative approach: a label that gives consumers at
least some concrete and pertinent information on underlying animal treatment practices.
A new form of label could be designed that would clearly and simply indicate the
78

See Consumer Union, http://www.eco-labels.org/home.cfm (last visited February 1, 2006). Consumer
Union provides ratings for some labels but not others. “Certified Humane Raised and Handled” and “Free
Farmed” labels are both rated “highly meaningful; the United Egg Producer’s “Animal Care Certified” logo
is not rated at all.
79
See supra note 65.
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producer’s compliance with a select, limited number of standards that have the greatest
impact on animal welfare, that reflect practices with the most salience to consumers, and
that have the greatest potential to highlight differences among producers’ practices. The
specific standards that would be reflected on the label would vary for different animal
species, depending on the specific issues of concern for that species and that industry.
The standards could change over time, as well, as the issues of concern change. This new
form of label might appear on food packaging at the retail level, alongside the familiar
nutritional information labeling.

Such a labeling approach would deliver relevant

information without being overwhelming, would facilitate comparisons across producers,
thus fostering competition, and would give consumers some idea of the practices that are
involved in producing the foods that they eat.
The criteria appearing on such a label would be very different from the criteria
currently in use in the various auditing and certification regimes surveyed earlier.80
Instead of a guideline requiring that atmospheric ammonia in broiler chicken facilities
not exceed so many parts per million,81 for example, a consumer-focused label might
contain disclosure of the frequency with which chickens suffer from chemical burns
caused by lying in unsanitary litter.82 Instead of a guideline on the handling and catching
of birds,83 a label might disclose the frequency of bruises, broken wings, and birds that
are dead on arrival at the processing plant, all of which can result from rough handling.
80

See Part IV, supra.
The National Chicken Council Guidelines require ammonia levels to be below 25 parts per million.
See supra note 45. The Humane Farm Animal Care guidelines require that ammonia levels not exceed 10
parts per million on average and never exceed 25 parts per million. See Animal Care Standards: Broiler
Chickens, supra note 38, at 7E23.
82
Litter saturated with urine and excrement leads to high ammonia concentrations, and chickens exposed
to unsanitary litter for long periods can suffer blisters and burns on their feet, legs and breasts. For a
summary of research on the health effects of unsanitary litter, see Report of the Scientific Committee on
Animal Health and Animal Welfare, The Welfare of Chickens Kept for
Meat Production (Broilers) 39-40 (2000) (produced for the European Commission Health & Consumer
Protection Directorate-General), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/scah/out39_en.pdf (last
visited February 9, 2006). For more details on the health and cost effects of poor litter quality
management, see Casey W. Ritz et. al, Litter Quality and Broiler Performance, Cooperative Extension
Bulletin 1267 (2005), available at http://pubs.caes.uga.edu/caespubs/pubs/PDF/B1267.pdf (last
visited February 9, 2006).
83
The National Chicken Council guidelines provide, among other things, that “[w]henever birds are
handled for any reason, including vaccinations, treatments, and movement to new facilities or to
processing, handling should be accomplished in such a manner as to avoid injuries. Abuse of the animals
should not be tolerated under any circumstances. . . . The number of birds in the catcher’s hand depends on
the size of the bird and should not cause injury to the birds. For birds weighing more than four pounds, the
maximum number of birds per hand is five.” See supra note 45, at 8.
81
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The most effective label criteria are likely to be those that focus on health and welfare
outcomes for the animals that are not only important from an animal welfare perspective,
but also are easily imagined by consumers. Thus, some husbandry practices that are no
doubt important from a welfare perspective – a lighting standard, for instance – may
prove difficult to translate to a consumer-based label unless they can be cast in terms of
tangible health and welfare effects.

Consumers would not know, without further

research, what happens to the birds if they get too little or too much light, whereas
chemical burns, foot and leg deformities, and bruises and broken bones are easily
grasped.
Because of the need for brevity and the difficulty in distilling some animal
welfare criteria, a consumer-focused label could not hope to capture the full range of
important factors that bear on animal welfare. The label would most likely serve to
complement, rather than supplant, the further development of certification and auditing
regimes. There is a hidden virtue, however, in the label’s inevitable incompleteness.
Decisions as to which factors make it on to the label will involve judgment calls, which
will no doubt be subject to considerable discussion among producer groups, animal
welfare organizations, and (for mandatory disclosure regimes) government regulators as
well. Discussion of what should be on the label would help stimulate public debate on
existing practices and animal welfare in much the same way that development of a
federal definition of “organic” and related claims has focused debate on organic
standards. Both the label and the process for developing the label would move animal
welfare issues into the fore.
If a labeling regime could be created to give consumers insight into actual
practices affecting animal welfare, how would producers be affected?

Disclosure

regimes are effective in inducing changes in behavior only to the extent that disclosers
are able to detect and respond to audience reaction. There is every reason to believe that
these conditions would be present for producers.

Consumers vote with their

pocketbooks, and producers are sensitive to profits and market share. If disclosure of
animal welfare information causes a shift in consumer demand, producers will detect the
shift and be motivated to accommodate that demand.
How easily could producers shift their methods to accommodate new demand for
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humane practices? A number of factors would come into play, including how much it
would cost producers to increase adherence to animal welfare standards, to what extent
producers would be able to pass these extra costs on to consumers, how quickly
producers could, as a logistical matter, shift to more humane techniques, and how easily
food retailers could switch their suppliers to those that use more humane methods. The
answers to these questions would vary by industry, but there is little doubt that movement
by food producers towards humane animal husbandry would be constrained by cost and
other feasibility concerns.
Unfortunately, there is little systematic evidence one way or the other on the
feasibility of humane food production practices in a global, industry-wide sense. An
existing literature does address the feasibility of specific humane farming techniques,84
and still other studies have identified changes in farming or production techniques that
enhance both animal welfare and profitability. Thus, we know that stockpersons should
treat animals non-aversively,85 piglets should have toys,86 sheep should have moderate
ventilation,87 cows should not be continuously bred,88 and dairy cows should not have

84

See, e.g., H.L.I. Bornett, J.H. Guy, and P.J. Cain, “Impact of Animal Welfare on Costs and Viability of
Pig Production in the UK,” 16 J. Agric. Envtl. Ethics 163-186 (2003) (comparing profitability of different
pig-rearing systems and concluding that pig welfare can be improved significantly with a modest increase
in cost, but that the current higher cost for pigs raised in high welfare systems must be maintained if high
welfare producers are to continue to be profitable); cf. Dermot J. Hayes and Helen H. Jensen, “Lessons
from the Danish Ban on Feed-Grade Antibiotics,” Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Briefing
Paper 03-BP 41 (June 2003) (available at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/publications/DBS/PDFFiles/03bp41.pdf) (last visited February 9, 2006)
(presenting an economic analysis of the consequences of a ban on antibiotic use in food animals in the
United States).
85
P.H. Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J. L. Barnett and S. Borg, “Relationships between Human-Animal
Interactions and Productivity of Commercial Dairy Cows,” 78 J. Anim. Sci. 2821-2831 (2000); P.H.
Hemsworth, G.J. Coleman, J.L. Barnett, S. Borg and S. Dowling, “The effects of cognitive behavioral
intervention on the attitude and behavior of stockpersons and the behavior and productivity of commercial
dairy cows,” 80 J. Anim. Sci. 68-78 (2002); Hemsworth, P.H., G.J. Coleman, and J.L. Barnett, “Improving
the attitude and behavior of stockpersons toward pigs and the consequences on the behavior and
reproductive performance of commercial pigs,” 39 Applied Animal Behavior Science, 349-362 (1994);
B.D. Voisinet, T. Grandin, J.D. Tatum, S.F. O’Connor and J.J. Struthers, “Feedlot cattle with calm
temperaments have higher average daily gains than cattle with excitable temperaments,” 75 J. Anim. Sci.
892-896 (1997).
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E.S. Jolly, J. B. Gaughan, and A. K. King, “Environmental enrichment for neonatal pigs and its
influence on post weaning aggression,” 80 J. Anim. Sci. 25-26 (Suppl. 1 2002).
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A.Sevi, M. Albenzio, G. Annicchiaric, M. Caroprese, R. Marino and L Taibi, “Effects of Ventilation
regimen on the welfare and performance of lactating ewes in summer,” 80 J. Anim. Sci. 2349-2361 (2002).
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L.A. Werth, S.M. Azzam, M.K. Nielsen, and J.E. Kinder, “Use of a simulation model to evaluate the
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Anim. Sci. 4710-4721 (1991).
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their tails docked.89 As these studies show, it is possible to compare the animal welfare
benefits of changing specific practices with the costs to producers of doing so, and
research in this vein will be crucial in determining the feasibility of particular shifts in
animal treatment that could arise through a disclosure regime.
Lest cost concerns loom too large in our minds, however, it is important to
remember that there is nothing in a labeling system, in the form that we propose, that
would require producers to change any of their practices. Producers who choose not to
pursue animal welfare-enhancing practices, and instead prefer to compete only on the
dimension of price, would be free to do so. Changes in producer behavior would occur
only in response to market forces, as consumers are empowered to make food choices
that take into account their preferences for different levels of animal welfare.
One other note. Our emphasis has been on disclosure through food labels, but a
more modest approach would enlist the Internet so as to publicize information about
practices that bear on animal welfare. It is easy to imagine a new website that collects
relevant information and makes it easily available to those who are interested, for
purposes either of consumer choices or democratic initiatives. The Toxic Release
Inventory is effective in part because of the easy availability, via the Internet, of relevant
information. A private website might well initiate a similar process for animal welfare. If
such a step would not do as much as a consumer label, at least it would provide a helpful
start.
VI. Concerns and Counterarguments
Because disclosure strategies are so modest, we believe that it is difficult to
support serious objections and counterarguments. But we can imagine the different
directions from which criticisms might be launched.
The first set of objections would come from those committed to animal welfare
and animal rights. As we have suggested, those concerned about animal suffering will
challenge the idea that the protection of animals should depend on how much human
89

C.A. Lunam, A.M. de Passille, and J. Rushen, Neuroma formation following tail docking of dairy
calves, 80 J. Anim. Sci. Suppl. 1/J. Dairy Sci. Vol. 85, Suppl. 1 (2002). C.B. Tucker and D.M. Weary, Tail
Docking in Dairy Cattle, Animal Welfare Information Center Bulletin, Winter 2001-Spring 2002, Vol. 11
No. 3-4
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beings are willing to pay to reduce that suffering. In many contexts, the willingness to
pay criterion is wholly inadequate. The Occupational Safety and Health Act requires
employers to protect employees from certain risks, and it does not allow market forces to
determine the level of worker protection. If animal suffering is an independent concern –
and our argument suggests that it is – then a market in such suffering seems wholly
inadequate, perhaps even a kind of joke.
We do not mean to challenge the idea that the suffering of animals ought not to
depend on how much people are willing to pay to prevent it. But at the very least, people
should be allowed to provide further protection to animals if they are willing to pay for
that protection. A serious problem with the current situation is that it does not provide an
easy mechanism by which people can express their commitments. Even if such a
mechanism would do far less than ought to be done, the argument on its behalf is
straightforward. Those who have especially strong commitments to animal rights and
animal welfare should welcome a step in this direction, if only because it will increase the
visibility of the practices to which they object, in a way that might well lead to more
significant change. Recall that our proposal is agnostic on the most ambitious claims
about human treatment of animals; our hope is that disclosure strategies might be favored
by those with competing views about those claims.
Another objection is possible from a different direction. Why ought disclosure
principles to focus on the use of animals? There are many possible candidates for
disclosure to consumers, even if the focus is limited to food. Disclosure might be
encouraged or mandated for environmental effects, salaries of high-level employees,
salaries of low-level employees, workplace accidents, layoffs, charitable activities on part
of firms, and more. For all of these items, consumers might be willing to pay something
to ensure compliance with their moral commitments. But a market in morality might
create a range of problems. For one thing, consumers might not have an adequate
understanding of the meaning of any particular disclosure, and their reactions may not be
entirely rational. (What is the rational response to significant layoffs in the last year, or to
$25,000 annual salaries for many employees?) For another, there is a serious question of
priority-setting: Why should any particular item be singled out for disclosure, as opposed
to various others?
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These are perfectly legitimate questions, and we do not mean to make any general
claims about the limits of disclosure or even about priority-setting. With respect to animal
welfare, the argument for disclosure stems from the evident fact that many consumers do
care, rationally, about suffering, and from the expectation that disclosure can be
undertaken in a way that will be genuinely informative. Perhaps other information
presents at least as strong an argument for disclosure. But it is not easy to find other areas
in which existing moral commitments are so palpably ill-served by existing markets,
simply because the underlying practices are invisible.
Conclusion
With respect to animal welfare, people’s practices do not correspond to their
moral judgments, simply because the consequences of those practices are barely visible.
A key question is how to make those practices more visible, so as to enable consumers to
choose as they wish. Our motivation here has been a belief that much more can be done
to provide consumers with information that will enable them to make choices that fit with
their values.
Existing animal welfare certification and assurance programs run by trade groups
and animal welfare organizations are steps in the right direction – but they are no more
than that. A better labeling system could improve both market processes and democratic
ones. It would improve markets because many consumers care about animal welfare, and
they lack relevant information when they decide what to buy and what to eat; a degree of
market competition, with respect to the treatment of animals, would be valuable for
human beings and animals alike. A labeling system would improve democratic processes
as well, because it would ensure that political judgments would be based on a real
awareness of the stakes. We have referred to the possibility of a virtuous circle here. The
most modest step, helping to accomplish similar goals, would be a website that collects
relevant information about the treatment of animals used for food.
Defenders of animal rights are unlikely to believe that a labeling regime will do
all of what must be done. In their view, more aggressive measures, directly forbidding the
cruelty and mistreatment, would be far better. But our goal here has been far more
modest. A serious problem, we suggest, lies in the mismatch between people’s moral
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commitments and their actual practices. A disclosure regime might not bring human
practices into alignment with what morality requires, but it would have the important
virtue of moving those practices in the direction of existing moral beliefs.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@uchicago.edu

Animal Rights without Controversy

26

The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (November 1999;
Ethics, v.110, no. 1)
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process
(November 1999; forthcoming Yale Law and Policy Review v.18 #1).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? (August 1999; Michigan Law
Review #3).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations
(November 1999, University of Virginia Law Review, v. 85).
David A. Strauss, Do Constitutional Amendments Matter? (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Culture and Government Money: A Guide for the Perplexed (April
2000).
Emily Buss, Without Peers? The Blind Spot in the Debate over How to Allocate
Educational Control between Parent and State (April 2000).
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle (June 2000).
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent (May 2000; Pennsylvania Law Review v. 149).
Mary Ann Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion
Clauses? (May 2001, Supreme Court Review, 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May, 2000).
Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental
Relations (June 2001)
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election (May 2001).
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the
Commons (August 2001).
Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches
(October 2001).
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? (October 2001).
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (November 2001).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in
Congress, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law (December 2001).
Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination (March 2002).
Geoffrey R. Stone, Above the Law: Research Methods, Ethics, and the Law of Privilege
(March 2002; forthcoming J. Sociological Methodology 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone? (March 2002).
Emily Buss, Parental Rights (May 2002, forthcoming Virginia Law Review).
David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? (May 2002).
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (May 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism
(June 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002).
Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? The Court and the Political Process (August 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002).
Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice (November 2002).
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (November 2002).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (November 2002).
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education (December 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees? (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches (January 2003).
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure (February 2003).
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice (March
2003).
Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights? Why Less Is More (March 2003)
Emily Buss, The Speech Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation (March 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron (May
2003)
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against (May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies (September 2003)
Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive Theory
(September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation (September 2003)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally
(November 2003)
Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal Law: The International Criminal
Court As a Roving Mixed Court (January 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere) (January 2004)
Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism (January 2004)
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law: Afterword (January
2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown (February 2004)
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence (February 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, You Are Entering a Gay- and Lesbian-Free Zone: On the Radical
Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers (February 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law (March 2004)
Derek Jinks and David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions? (July
2004)
Derek Jinks and Ryan Goodman, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
Human Rights Law (March 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Law of War (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status (April 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility (June
2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun Laws:
Exploding the Gun Culture Wars {A Call to Historians} (June 2004)

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs (July 2004)
Derek Jinks, Disaggregating “War” (July 2004)
Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information
Markets (August 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law
(September 2004)
Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness and the ADA (September
2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation (October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry (October 2004)
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law (October 2004)
Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Tim Wu, The Breach Theory of Treaty Enforcement (February 2005, revised March 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics (February 2005)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal? (March
2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The
Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting (April 2005)
Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law (April 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
Adam B. Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics (April 2005, NYU L. Rev. 70, #3)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005, Harvard L. Rev.,
forthcoming)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing L.A.’s Skid Row: Crime and Real Estate Development in
Downtown Los Angeles [An Experiment in Real Time] (May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment (May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an
Actuarial Age (May 2005)
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards (May 2005)
Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind” (June 2005)
Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures (June 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Commons (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat (August 2005)
Adam Samaha, Executive Exposure: Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and
Platforms for Judicial Intervention (August 2005, revised November 2005)
Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical
Investigation of Legal Interpretation (August 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)

106. Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy
(September 2005)
107. Tracey Meares and Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together (October 2005)
108. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
109. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November
2005)
110. Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
111. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005)
112. Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting
Principles (November 2005)
113. Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial Resistance in the
Schiavo Controversy (November 2005)
114. Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population
Rates in Empirical Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime,
Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial
Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States (January 2006)
115. Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January
2006)
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
117. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure (February 2006)
118. Douglas G. Lichtman, Captive Audiences and the First Amendment (February 2006)
119. Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States (March 2006)
120. Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy (March 2006)
121. Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006)
122. Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers (March
2006)

